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Problems of Proof for the Ban on Female Athletes with
Endogenously High Testosterone Levels
Silver Lin *

Abstract
At the time of this writing, a new International Association of Athletics Federations
regulation preventing women with naturally high testosterone from competing in certain
international athletics events has reignited the controversy over the male-female distinction in
sports and its implications on individuals’ right to compete. A recent case filed by runner Caster
Semenya and Athletics South Africa challenging this regulation before the Court of Arbitration
for Sport, an arbitral tribunal that adjudicates disputes in international sports, sought to have
the regulation overturned as discriminatory against women with a genetic intersex condition.
Drawing on established international arbitration law, international norms in arbitrations, and
relevant precedent, this Comment explores the evidentiary issues before the Court of Arbitration
for Sport in Semenya’s challenge. In particular, this Comment argues that, given the high stakes
of the case as well as the inequity in resources between the parties, the Court of Arbitration for
Sport should have adopted unconventional rules with respect to the allocation of the burden of
proof, the requisite standard of proof, and the evaluation of scientific evidence to ensure a fair
hearing on the matter. The Comment ultimately concludes that the suggested changes are well
within the discretion and ability of the Court of Arbitration for Sport to implement, slight
challenges to the adoption of each proposed measure notwithstanding.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Since the late 1960s, international sports organizations have conducted
gender testing to police the divide between men’s and women’s competitions. 1
Due to improvements in science and technology, the nature of such testing has
evolved over the years. 2 As international sports organizations have developed a
greater recognition of the lack of a binary gender classification, regulating bodies
have likewise walked back from mandatory gender testing. 3 Yet this reduction in
gender testing cannot be seen as a complete victory for those opposed to such
testing, for the mandatory tests have only been replaced by testing on a case-bycase basis in some sporting bodies, most notably in the International Olympic
Committee (IOC) and in the International Association of Athletics Federations
(IAAF). 4 In particular, new understandings of hyperandrogenism, “a congenital
disorder [that] leads to elevated levels of testosterone due to an androgen
insensitivity,” 5 has generally led to a greater acceptance of hyperandrogenic
women, 6 or women with biological features more commonly associated with
masculinity. 7 Given this new understanding of intersex conditions, the argument
for eliminating gender testing based on problematic metrics like testosterone has
gained much traction in the sporting world and has furthered the controversy
surrounding the current system of case-by-case testing. 8
Despite advances in biology that cast doubt upon the traditional gender
divide, the IAAF announced on April 26, 2018 new regulations limiting
participation of female athletes whose testosterone levels are outside the normal
female range (as defined by the IAAF’s medical and science experts) in certain
track events, such as the 400-meter and 1600-meter races. 9 Setting the threshold
1

2

3

4

See Maayan Sudai, The Testosterone Rule—Constructing Fairness in Professional Sport, 4 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES
181, 182 (2017).
Erin Elizabeth Berry, Respect for the Fundamental Notion of Fairness of Competition: the IAAF,
Hyperandrogenism, and Women Athletes, 27 WIS. J. L. GEND. & SOC’Y 207, 212–13 (2012).
Dutee Chand v. Athletics Federation of India (AFI) & The International Association of Athletics
Foundation (IAAF), CAS 2014/A/3759, ¶¶ 294–95 (July 24, 2015).
Berry, supra note 2, at 208.

5

Anna Boyd, Back to the Binary: How the Olympics Struggle with Separation of Male and Female, 14 DEPAUL
J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13 (2018).

6

See generally Erin Buzuvis, Hormone Check: Critique of Olympic Rules on Sex and Gender, 31 WIS. J. L.
GEND. & SOC’Y 29 (2016) (advocating hybrid approaches of uniform gender identity and hormone
rules in categorizing competitors and suggesting openness to redefining gender norms in
international sports).

7

See id. at 53 (defining hyperandrogenism).
See Berry, supra note 2, at 209.

8
9

See IAAF Introduces New Eligibility Regulations for Female Classification, IAAF (Apr. 26, 2018),
http://perma.cc/3CRF-29J4.
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for participation in competition at 5 nanomoles per liter (nmol/L) of testosterone,
the regulation bans women with 46 XY differences in sexual development (DSDs)
and thus endogenously, or naturally-occurring, high testosterone levels from
competing in the named events unless they undergo treatment to lower their
testosterone levels or choose to participate in men’s competitions. 10
The new regulations come after a similar rule that restricted competition
participation for women with over 10 nmol/L of testosterone was temporarily
invalidated by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in July 2015 in Dutee Chand
v. Athletics Federation of India (AFI) & IAAF. 11 CAS temporarily enjoined
enforcement of the competition ban on the grounds that the IAAF, inter alia, did
not provide enough evidence that an endogenous testosterone level differential
resulted in unfair competitive outcomes. 12 Because the new regulations supplant
the policies at issue in the 2015 case, that case is now rendered moot. With respect
to the latest regulation on women with high testosterone, the IAAF claims to have
strong evidence supporting its conclusion that high DSDs such as endogenously
elevated testosterone levels lead to differences in athletic performance, arguably
providing the necessary justification for the new regulation. 13 Although the new
regulations were scheduled to go into effect on November 1, 2018, South African
runner Caster Semenya, who has been in the spotlight as a female athlete with
naturally-elevated testosterone levels, filed a challenge to the regulation before
CAS in June 2018. 14 In light of Semenya’s challenge, the IAAF agreed to suspend
implementation of the regulation until CAS resolves the matter. 15
From February 18–22, 2019, panelists the Honorable Dr. Annabelle Bennett,
the Honorable Hugh L. Fraser and Dr. Hans Nater heard Semenya’s challenge to the
DSD regulations and the IAAF’s response. 16 On May 1, 2019, CAS released the
decision in Semenya’s challenge, dismissing the requests for arbitration because
Semenya and Athletics South Africa (ASA) were unable to prove the invalidity of
10

11
12
13

See id.; see also CAS, CAS Arbitration: Caster Semenya, Athletics South Africa (ASA) and International
Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF): Decision, CAS MEDIA RELEASE (May 1, 2018),
http://perma.cc/B6X5-LAAC [hereinafter 2019 CAS Media Release].
See Chand, supra note 3, at 160.
Chand, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 547–48.
See IAAF, supra note 9; see also Audie Cornish & Katrina Karakazis, IAAF Creates Rule to Ban Women
with Naturally High Testosterone Levels from Competition, NPR (Apr. 30, 2018), http://perma.cc/E57LY3MH.

14

See Dan Roe, Caster Semenya’s Pro Eligibility is Still in Question. Here’s Why That’s Total Bullshit, RUNNER’S
WORLD (Oct. 17, 2018), http://perma.cc/KRW8-SJBM; see also Nick Zaccardi, Caster Semenya on
New IAAF Rule: ‘Discriminatory, Irrational, Unjustifiable’, NBCSPORTS (June 18, 2018),
http://perma.cc/7D9N-6MXY.

15

See Roe, supra note 14.
2019 CAS Media Release, supra note 10.

16
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the new DSD regulations. 17 Referencing the as-yet unpublicized panel decision,
the release simply stated that “[t]he Panel found that the DSD Regulations are
discriminatory but the majority of the Panel found that . . . such discrimination is
a necessary, reasonable and proportionate means of achieving” fair competition. 18
Although the media release announced the panel’s ultimate conclusion and the
panel’s own reservations about such an outcome, the statement failed to explain
the process by which the panel arrived at its decision. 19 As of June 3, 2019,
however, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland temporarily suspended the
application of the DSD Regulations to Semenya pending further hearing. 20
As a result of the controversy surrounding the IAAF’s new ban and its
adverse effect on certain female athletes, Semenya’s challenge has been closely
scrutinized and compared to the 2015 Chand case, in part due to the potential
ramifications of the outcome of this challenge. 21 One resounding allegation
against the ban is that it discriminates unjustly against a small group of elite female
athletes on the basis of poor scientific evidence. 22 While scholars have commented
on the discriminatory nature of the new regulation and debated the merits of the
underlying science, 23 procedural issues have largely been overlooked. This
Comment addresses the problems Semenya’s challenge faced in an arbitral hearing
before CAS given the framework laid out in Chand. By exploring the generally
accepted rules of evidence in international arbitration, this Comment argues that
CAS procedures should have been updated in Semenya’s case—and should be
updated in future cases—to ensure athletes receive a fair hearing on the merits of
their claims. The Comment focuses on CAS proceedings not simply because of
the possibility of a remand of Semenya’s case to CAS, but also because of CAS’s
history of dealing with such procedural issues and its scope for improvement in
future cases.
Section II describes the principal parties involved in this most recent
challenge and CAS’s role. This Section also touches on CAS procedures in Chand
and how similar procedural decisions may have affected Semenya’s challenge.
Section III discusses the current laws governing the taking of evidence in
international arbitration, and the norms that operate in the absence of codified
evidentiary laws. Finally, Section IV advances a three-fold argument for a novel
17

Id.

18

Id.
Id.

19
20

See Yomi Kazeem, Caster Semenya can compete again without testosterone-reducing drugs—for now, QUARTZ
AFRICA (June 4, 2019), http://perma.cc/SP5W-XC8M.

21

See Roe, supra note 14.
See Jeré Longman, Track’s New Gender Rules Could Exclude Some Female Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25,
2018), http://perma.cc/A769-XBD9.
See Roe, supra note 14.

22

23
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CAS procedural approach to high-stakes cases such as those cases effectively
preventing athletes from international competition. Grounded in examples from
other international decisions and an evidentiary framework borrowed from
United States (U.S.) jurisprudence, this Comment argues normatively for the
following changes to the current arbitration procedures: (1) that the burden of
proof for the necessity of the ban should be on the regulating entity; (2) that the
standard for this burden of proof should be to the CAS panel’s comfortable
satisfaction; and (3) that the CAS panel should use a multifactor framework for
assessing the quality of the scientific studies and other expert evidence presented
by the parties.

II. S EMENYA , THE IAAF, AND CAS
A. The Principal Parties
Caster Semenya’s story highlights the ongoing nature of the controversy
surrounding the competition eligibility of athletes with atypical biology. Semenya
burst onto the international track scene in 2008 with her first gold medal win in
the 800 meter at the Commonwealth Youth Games. 24 She followed up her success
at the junior level by winning the 800 meter and 1500 meter races at the 2009
African Junior Championships. 25 It was around the time of this initial success that
word of Semenya being forced to undergo sex testing first leaked. 26 The rumored
result of the sex testing was that Semenya had “the external genitalia of a female,
but internal testes, instead of ovaries and a uterus,” 27 a result that was meant to be
confidential and which the IAAF did not confirm. 28 Although Semenya was
eventually allowed to retain her medals and cleared to continue competing, the
controversy surrounding her sex did not end. 29 Despite, or perhaps because of,
Semenya’s tremendous success internationally, including her multiple gold medals
at the 2016 Rio Olympics, Semenya’s eligibility to race has continued to be a topic
of conversation throughout her entire career. 30

24

Shawn M. Crincoli, You Can Only Race if You Can’t Win? The Curious Cases of Oscar Pistorius & Caster
Semenya, 12 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 133, 154 (2011).

25

Id.
Id. at 137, n. 27.

26
27

Anna Peterson, But She Doesn’t Run Like A Girl…: The Ethic of Fair Play and the Flexibility of the Binary
Conception of Sex, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 315, 316 (2010).

28

Id.
Id.

29
30

See Boyd, supra note 5, at 6; Crincoli, supra note 24, at 137–38. See also Peterson, supra note 27, at
316–17.
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Partially responsible for this controversy is the IAAF, the governing body
for international track competitions since 1912. 31 One of the world’s largest
sporting organizations, 32 the IAAF was created to act as the central authority on
regulating athletics internationally and to serve as the official global
recordkeeper. 33 In keeping with its original purpose, the IAAF enacts policies and
regulations affecting athletes’ participation in international track and field
competitions. Due to the IAAF’s role as “the primary regulator of athletics from
the sub-national level all the way up to the Olympic level,” 34 athletes who wish to
compete internationally arguably have no other recourse but to agree to be bound
by its rules, including the DSD Regulations now in dispute. 35
When controversies between athletes and the IAAF inevitably arise, CAS
serves as the forum for such dispute resolution. 36 The IAAF Competition Rules
state that
[i]n all CAS appeals involving the IAAF, CAS and the CAS Panel shall be
bound by the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations. In the case of any
conflict between CAS rules currently in force and the IAAF Constitution,
Rules and Regulations, the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations shall
take precedence. 37

A private governing body, CAS was “designed specifically to adjudicate
sports-related disputes and is essentially sport’s ultimate umpire,” often handing
down the final word in such disputes. 38 CAS was intended to be “an institution
capable of achieving the quick, efficient, inexpensive and binding resolution of
sporting disputes.” 39 In this capacity, CAS now “plays a key role within the global
governance regime for athletics by holding the IAAF accountable in its regulatory
activities.” 40
Because CAS is a private tribunal, it creates and follows its own procedural
41
rules rather than formally adopting all of the rules of a particular jurisdiction.
31

Michele Krech, To Be a Woman in the World of Sport: Global Regulation of the Gender Binary in Elite
Athletics, 35 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 262, 278 (2017).

32

Id. at 279.
Id. at 278.

33
34
35

36

37
38
39
40
41

Id.
See Longman, supra note 22 (“Female athletes with elevated testosterone levels will essentially face
a ‘choice of no choice[.]’”).
Rachelle Downie, Improving the Performance of Sport’s Ultimate Umpire: Reforming the Governance of the Court
of Arbitration for Sport, 12 MELB. J. INT’L L. 315, 317 (2011).
Chand, supra note 3, at ¶ 438.
Downie, supra note 36, at 316.
Id. at 317.
Krech, supra note 31, at 291.
Downie, supra note 36, at 318.
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The fact that CAS sets its own procedural rules is significant because CAS panels
often make their own evidentiary rules on a case-by-case basis and are not bound
by other international laws governing evidentiary issues. 42 Currently, CAS panels
need only follow the CAS Code of Sports-related Arbitration (Code), and where
the Code is silent on a relevant evidentiary issue, as it often is, the appointed CAS
panel resolves the issue. 43 In reality, then, as “the supreme forum for international
sport,” 44 a particular CAS panel can adopt evidentiary rules that in turn have widereaching effects on athletes by handing down decisions that substantively affect
athletes’ rights to compete with little oversight or mechanism for review.

B. Relevant CAS Precedents
Since its inception, CAS has heard cases ranging from Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) disciplinary hearings45 to doping
violations challenges. 46 One of the most relevant precedents for the purposes of
this Comment is the aforementioned case involving Dutee Chand, an Indian
sprinter who underwent sex testing in 2014 after “several female athletes attending
a training camp with Chand apparently expressed concern to the AFI President
about her ‘masculine’ physique.” 47 After a round of testing, “the [Sports Authority
of India] notified Chand that she would be excluded from the upcoming World
Junior Championships and would not be eligible for selection to the
Commonwealth Games because her ‘male hormone’ levels were too high.” 48
Instead of forcibly lowering her testosterone through treatment, Chand decided
to challenge her participation ban before CAS, alleging that the
Hyperandrogenism Regulations impermissibly discriminated against women with
naturally high testosterone levels. 49

42

Chris Davies, The ‘Comfortable Satisfaction’ Standard of Proof: Applied by the Court of Arbitration for Sport
in Drug-Related Cases, 14 U. NOTRE DAME AUSTL. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) (CAS “is a non-judicial,
international body which has made it clear that it does not have to follow the rules of evidence.”).

43

Anthony Rigozzi & Brianna Quinn, Evidentiary Issues Before CAS, in INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CAS – 4TH CONFERENCE CAS & SAV/FSA LAUSANNE 2012 1, 3
(Michele Bernasconi ed., 2014).
Downie, supra note 36, at 317.

44
45

Matthew J. Mitten, The Court of Arbitration for Sport and Its Global Jurisprudence: International Legal
Pluralism in a World Without National Boundaries, 30 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 17 n. 84 (2014).

46

Id. at 21.
Krech, supra note 31, at 272.

47
48
49

Id. at 273.
Id.
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The CAS panel reached its decision in Chand’s case after three days of
testimony from sixteen witnesses. 50 Throughout the hearing, both parties
presented evidence in the form of expert testimony in support of their positions. 51
Chand argued that the IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations were unduly
discriminatory on the basis of sex, 52 while the IAAF took the position that such a
regulation “was justified as a necessary, reasonable, and proportionate means of
creating a level playing field for female athletes as whole.” 53 The panel proceeded
by first asking each party to lay out their requests regarding the burden and
standard of proof before holding that the initial burden of proof would be on
Chand, and the standard of proof would simply be on the balance of
probabilities. 54 Then, each party presented evidence, including multiple experts’
testimonies, regarding the acceptability of the science behind the
Hyperandrogenism Regulations. 55 After ruling on the procedural elements of the
arbitration, conducting the taking of evidence, and weighing the substantive
evidence, the CAS panel determined that “the IAAF did not meet its burden of
establishing that [the alleged] competitive advantage was of sufficient degree to
warrant the exclusion of women with testosterone levels higher than 10
nmol/L,” 56 which experts for the IAAF in Chand asserted falls between .1 and
3.08 nmol/L for female athletes generally. 57 However, while the CAS panel did
enjoin the IAAF from immediately implementing its regulations, it did so
provisionally, allowing the case to be reheard if the IAAF presented more
persuasive scientific evidence for the basis of the Regulations within two years of
the decision. 58 Although CAS’s holding in Chand has been mooted by the new
regulations, this 2015 ruling matters not only because of its impact on Chand’s
case, but also because it sets persuasive precedent for other CAS cases, most
recently, Semenya’s latest challenge before the tribunal.

50
51
52
53

Id.
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 274 (citing Chand, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 35(f), 230, 500).

54

Chand, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 442–447. The balance of probabilities standard has been thought of as an
event having at least a 51% chance of having occurred. See Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 32.

55

Id. at ¶¶ 451–453.
Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 40.

56
57
58

Chand, supra note 3, at ¶ 189.
Buzuvis, supra note 7, at 40.
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III. C URRENT I NTERNATIONAL A RBI TRATI ON L AWS
AND N ORMS
The outcome of Chand raises questions regarding the procedural decisions
made by the CAS panel. Specifically, the apparent lack of justification for the
panel’s conclusions on the proper burden, standard, admissibility, and evaluation
of proof call into question the panel’s decision-making process. This section
explores the relevant law that governs international arbitral tribunals generally and
as applied to CAS, from codifications such as the International Bar Association’s
(IBA) Rules on the Taking of Evidence or the Swiss Rules of International
Arbitration, to non-codified norms developed through precedential decisions in
international adjudications generally. This section concludes that the current state
of the law gives individual arbitral panels a high level of discretion in developing
procedural rules for admitting and considering evidence.

A. Absence of Binding Arbitral Laws
Perhaps one of the most notable characteristics of CAS is its lack of guidance
from substantive law. Currently, CAS is governed by Chapter 12 of the Swiss
Private International Law Act (PILA), which includes rules for international
arbitrations in Switzerland, 59 such as the rules for arbitrator selection, jurisdiction,
arbitral choice of law, and the finality of awards. 60 However, the Swiss rules as
codified provide little procedural guidance to CAS panels due to their brevity on
evidentiary issues. For instance, the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration only
include three clauses on evidence, none of which considers the quality of evidence,
and one of which simply states: “The arbitral tribunal shall determine the
admissibility, relevance, materiality, and weight of the evidence.” 61 Similarly,
Chapter 12 of the PILA provides scant guidance—indeed, Article 184, Section 3:
Taking of Evidence only states that “[t]he arbitral tribunal shall itself conduct the
taking of evidence” and that “the arbitral tribunal may request the assistance of
the state judge at the seat of the arbitral tribunal.” 62
The lack of firm guidance on evidentiary procedure appears to pervade
international arbitration in most, if not all, substantive areas, 63 and international
59
60

61
62
63

Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 2.
Chapter 12: International Arbitration, Swiss Private International Law Act [hereinafter Private
International Law Act] (Switz.).
Swiss Chambers’ Arbitration Institution, Swiss Rules of International Arbitration, art. 24 (2012).
Private International Law Act, supra note 60, at art. 184 § 3.
Abhinav Bhushan, Standard and Burden of Proof in International Commercial Arbitration: Is There a Bright
Line Rule?, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 601, 602 (2014) (“Most major international arbitration
institutions do not provide for specific evidentiary standards in their rules but do provide for
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sports arbitrations are no exception. This deference to arbitral tribunal discretion
on a case-by-case basis is exemplified by the IBA Rules on Evidence, which “are
a relevant, if not the pre-eminent, body of evidentiary rules in modern arbitral
practice, even if they are often considered ‘non-binding’ in many instances.” 64 As
the primary standard-setter for evidentiary rules in international disputes, and
given the lack of procedural guidance and the choice of law provisions in the
Code, 65 the IBA Rules act as a default for international arbitrations. 66 Ideally, to
provide greater guidance to international dispute resolution fora, the IBA Rules
on Evidence would outline a set of rules or standards for international arbitral
tribunals to consider when various evidentiary questions arise, such as how to
allocate the burden of proof between parties, or “‘which party has to prove what,
in order for its case to prevail,’” 67 and whether to admit or bar certain types of
evidence from hearings. However, the IBA Rules do not actually provide much
guidance for arbitral tribunals on the “burdens or standards of proof and other
issues such as presumptions or inferences in evidence.” 68 For instance, Article 9:
Disclosure and Admissibility of Evidence of the IBA Rules on Evidence simply
provides that
[t]he Arbitral Tribunal shall, at the request of a Party or on its own motion,
exclude from evidence or production any Document, statement, oral
testimony or inspection for . . . considerations of procedural economy,
proportionality, fairness or equality of the Parties that the Arbitral Tribunal
determines to be compelling. 69

Article 9.3 then goes on to emphasize the arbitral tribunal’s discretion in
taking fairness and equality into account when making evidentiary rulings, 70
reaffirming the vague standard of fairness to the parties in international arbitration
without providing more concrete guidance. As such, the IBA Rules on Evidence
provide insufficient direction to CAS panels by failing to codify specific rules or
even overarching standards on many facets of evidence consideration.

arbitrators’ discretion.”); see also Jennifer Vanderhart, Gatekeeping: U.S. Litigation vs. Arbitration, 12
EXPERT WITNESSES 3, 3 (2016).
64

NATHAN D. O’MALLEY, RULES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: AN ANNOTATED
GUIDE 10 (2012).

65

Court of Arbitration for Sport, Code of Sports-related Arbitration ¶ R44.3 (2019).
O’MALLEY, supra note 64, at 10.

66
67
68

69

70

Rompetrol Group N.V. v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, ¶ 178 (May 6, 2013).
Kabir A. N. Duggal, Evidentiary Principles in Investor-State Arbitration, 28 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 3, 5
(2017).
PETER ASHFORD, THE IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: A GUIDE 141 (2013).
Id. at 141–42.
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Internationally adopted guidelines on the taking of evidence outside of the
pure international arbitration context are likewise silent on how to allocate the
burden of proof between parties and the standards of proof to be used in various
circumstances. 71 For instance, “that arbitrators have discretion to determine the
evidentiary weight of evidence is generally accepted and expressly codified . . .
in Art. 27(4) of the [United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL)] Rules and Art. 24(2) of the Swiss Rules.” 72 Further emphasizing
arbitral tribunal discretion,
[t]he International Court of Justice has stated that ‘[t]he appraisal of the
probative value of documents and evidence appertained to the discretionary
power of the arbitrator is not open to question.’ This discretion provides
arbitrators with the ability to alter the applicable procedure according to the
requirements of the subject matter of the dispute. 73

In short, the lack of codified guidance combined with the presumptive
deference to arbitral discretion can render international arbitration a highly
unpredictable dispute resolution forum for parties. Absent more formal rules,
norms developed over the course of different international arbitrations may
supply panels with further guidance.

B. International Arbitration Norms on the Burden of Proof
While one may expect that the lack of a strong legal framework in the IBA
Rules on Evidence would create many challenges for independent arbitral
tribunals such as CAS, the loose framework does provide some benefits. The
greatest advantage of having so much flexibility is that parties can then operate
within this framework to argue for a different burden or standard of proof. In
fact, the lack of a strong framework has led to the establishment of a number of
norms regarding the burden of proof in international arbitration. Examples from
various international dispute resolution fora, including CAS itself, highlight how
values such as party consensus and fairness generated norms regarding burden of
proof.
One such norm is that evidentiary issues are often decided by the parties
themselves as long as norms of procedural fairness are adhered to, in keeping with
the idea of party autonomy. 74 Because parties have so much say in determining
71

Bhushan, supra note 63, at 604 (“There are few institutional rules that address the issue of burden
of proof.”)

72

TOBIAS ZUBERBÜHLER ET AL., IBA RULES OF EVIDENCE COMMENTARY ON THE IBA RULES ON THE
TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 167 (2012) (emphasis in original).

73

Bhushan, supra note 63, at 602 (citing Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of
Spain on Dec. 23, 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. Rep. 192, 215–216 (Nov. 18)).

74

Bhushan, supra note 63, at 601. See also Francisco Blavi & Gonzalo Vial, The Burden of Proof in
International Commercial Arbitration: Are We Allowed to Adjust the Scales, 39 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
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how an arbitral panel will consider evidence, parties wishing to establish a
particular evidentiary rule can argue “that a specific procedural agreement entered
into by the parties should prevail over the general procedural agreement . . . Any
such specific agreement should always prevail, unless it is not consistent with what
one could call the ‘mandatory procedural rules’ contained in the Code,” 75 which
would rarely be the case, given the Code’s silence on the burdens and standards
of proof.
Another very important international arbitration norm that has developed is
the generally accepted principle that “the burden of proving the existence of an
alleged fact shall rest on the person who derives rights from that fact.” 76 This
principle originates from the phrase onus probandi actori incumbit, which roughly
translates to “the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff,” where plaintiff does not
“mean the plaintiff from the procedural standpoint, but the real claimant in view
of the issues involved.” 77 In other words, “each party has to prove the facts on
which it relies to support its case,” 78 and that may not necessarily be the party
bringing the case. There are a number of policy justifications for such an allocation
of the burden of proof, such as the fact that it is often “difficult to distinguish
between parties as claimant and respondent in international procedure,” and “[i]t
is the duty of the parties to co-operate [sic] with international tribunals so as to
establish the truth of a case.” 79
International tribunals tend to adopt rules that track the principle of having
each party prove the facts upon which they rely. For instance, Article 19 of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) International Rules requires each party
to prove the facts that party relies upon. Article 24(1) of the UNCITRAL requires
the same. 80 Similarly, “tribunals in [International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)]

L. REV. 41, 54 (2016) (“[W]hat seems to be undisputed is that the rules governing the arbitration
depend primarily on the parties’ agreement, and therefore, special deference shall be given to their
decisions regarding different procedural and substantive issues, which includes the burden of
proof.”).
75
76

77

Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 3.
Id. at 15, quoting Schweizerisches Zicilgesetzbuch [ZGB], Code Civil [CC], Codice Civile [CC] [Civil
Code] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art. 8 (Switz.).
O’Malley, supra note 64, at 197–98 (citing Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. The Republic of Sri
Lanka, Final Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, 27 June 1990 in Y.B. COMMERCIAL ARB., vol.
XVII 121 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1992).

78

Blavi & Vial, supra note 74, at 44 (describing the general rule in international commercial arbitration,
which can be generalized to other dispute resolution fora).

79

Duggal, supra note 68, at 38.
Bhushan, supra note 63, at 604.

80
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arbitration cases also routinely hold that each party must prove the facts on which
it relies in support of its claims and defenses[.]” 81
International judgments, both arbitral and non-arbitral, have accordingly
assigned the burden of proof to the claimant asserting a fact. In U.S.—Measures
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 82 the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Appellate Body stated “that the burden of proof rests upon
the party, whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a
particular claim or defence.” 83 In that case, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s
decision to allocate to India the burden of proof regarding its claims, and to
require the U.S. to rebut the presumption if India met its initial burden. 84 In a case
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the court had to decide whether
the Temple of Preah Vihear was situated in Cambodia or Thailand, and therefore
which sovereign had the right to occupy the area. 85 Part of the ICJ’s decision
hinged on the burden of proof for each of the parties, on which the court noted,
“[b]oth Cambodia and Thailand base their respective claims on a series of facts
and contentions which are asserted or put forward by one Party or the other. The
burden of proof in respect of these will of course lie on the Party asserting them
or putting them forward.” 86 All of this is to say that, even in different contexts in
international adjudication, tribunals have adhered to the maxim that each party
bears the burden of proving the facts it asserts.
Combining this shared burden of proof with the wide discretion given to
arbitrators, an international arbitral panel “may, as influenced by the logical
sequence of facts involved in a claim or as imposed by the substantive law or other
circumstances of the case, allocate to one side or the other the risk of not
producing the evidence in support of their case.” 87 Arbitral tribunals have thus
been known to re-allocate the burden of proof to the responding party when a
claimant has established prima facie the truth of its claims. 88
81

82

83
84

Andrea J. Menaker & Brody K. Greenwald, Proving Corruption in International Arbitration Who Has the
Burden and How Can it be Met?, in ADDRESSING ISSUES OF CORRUPTION IN COMMERCIAL AND
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 77-102, 80 (Domitille Baizeau & Richard Kreindler eds., 2015).
Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 14,
WTO Doc. WT/DS33/AB/R (adopted Apr. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Measures Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts].
Duggal, supra note 68, at 39 (quoting Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts).
See Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts, supra note 82, at 12–14.

85

See Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand) Merits, Judgment, 1962
I.C.J. Rep. 6, 15–16 (June 15) [hereinafter Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear].

86

Id. at 16.
O’MALLEY, supra note 64, at 205.

87
88

Angeliki K. Rousaki, Corruption in International Commercial Arbitration, 20 VINDOBONA J. OF INT’L
COM. LAW & ARB. 29, 34–35 (2016) (“It has been asserted that in cases where prima facie evidence
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Notably, the CAS panel in Chand adopted a variant of the shifting standard
of proof:
During the course of the hearing, the Panel requested the parties to set out
their position concerning the burden and standard of proof. The parties
agreed that the Athlete bore the burden of proving that the
Hyperandrogenism Regulations are invalid. The parties also agreed that, once
a prima facie case of discrimination is established, the burden shifts to the party
responsible for the discriminating measure to justify the discriminatory
effect. 89

In sum, while the 2015 Chand panel appeared to shift the burden of proof
by adopting the position that Chand need only establish, prima facie, that there was
a discriminatory effect, it still found that the competing evidence “as to whether
endogenous and exogenous testosterone have the same or different effects on the
body did not enable the Panel to draw a conclusion one way or the other.” 90 But
the panel did definitively say that Chand bore the onus of showing “that the
Hyperandrogenism Regulations [were] unsupported by, or not based on, scientific
data and that a difference does exist between the effects of endogenous and
exogenous testosterone” and that she failed to meet the onus of the burden of
proof. 91 Such a determination appears to support the position that, although the
panel facially stated that the burden of proof would shift to the IAAF to establish
that the Regulations are justifiable as reasonable and proportionate after Chand
made a prima facie showing of discrimination, 92 in fact Chand bore the burden of
proof of her claims. This case accordingly suggests that some instances of burden
of proof shifts are not as complete as panel decisions would make them appear.
One salient example in international arbitration in which the burden of proof
is actually shifted is in cases of alleged doping violations before CAS. In recent
doping cases, CAS and other tribunals have shifted the burden of proof to the
anti-doping organization, even when the athlete is the party filing suit, due to the
punitive nature of such anti-doping findings. In fact, in a rare instance of
codification of the burden of proof in international law, Article 3.1 of the 2009
World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) provides that “[t]he Anti-Doping
Organization shall have the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule
violation has occurred.” 93 Courts hearing challenges to doping sanctions have
applied this shifted burden of proof to the responding party, particularly when an

89
90
91
92
93

of corruption exists, the burden of proof should be shifted to the suspected party . . . in some cases
arbitral tribunals seem to have engaged this practice.”).
Chand, supra note 3, at ¶ 441.
Id. at ¶ 488.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 443.
Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 16.
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anti-doping allegation is based on circumstantial evidence. 94 For example, in
USADA v. Collins, 95 the [North American Court of Arbitration for Sport Panel]
required the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the athlete used a prohibited substance or technique. 96 The takeaway
from the example of doping is simply that, when the stakes are high and evidence
relevant to the merits of the claims are in the hands of the respondent, not the
initial claimant, shifting the burden of proof to the respondent party (which also
happens to be the regulating body) can help achieve the norms of fairness and
equality as outlined by the IBA. 97

C. International Arbitration Norms on the Standard of Proof
In addition to deciding how to allocate the burden of proof between parties,
courts in international arbitration must also establish the standard of proof, which
“defines how much evidence is needed to establish either an individual issue or
the party’s case as a whole.” 98 The most relevant norm in this context consists of
the standard of proof that is most often applied in substantively similar cases. As
Professor Antonio Rigozzi and Brianna Quinn assert, in international sports law,
the familiar balance of probabilities standard is typical for civil proceedings, while
a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is applied for criminal proceedings. 99
Additional standards include:
a) ‘Comfortable satisfaction’ – a standard of proof that is stated to be lower
than the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, but higher than the
civil standard of balance of probabilities;
b) ‘Personal conviction’ – most akin to comfortable satisfaction and found in
[Article] 97 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code; and

94

Richard H. McLaren, An Overview of Non-Analytical Positive & Circumstantial Evidence Cases in Sports,
16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 193, 194 (2006) (describing different standards of proof and
circumstantial evidence used in various example cases).

95

USADA v. Collins, AAA No. 30 190 00658 04 (Dec. 2004).
McLaren, supra note 94, at 198 (citing USADA v. Collins).

96
97

See, for example, in the international human rights context, Gómez-Palomino v. Peru, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136, ¶ 106 (Nov. 22, 2005)
(pointing out “that forced disappearance . . . requires the State to comply with its international
obligations in good faith and to provide all necessary information . . . Consequently, any attempt to
shift the burden of proof to the victims or their next of kin is contrary to [the international
obligations imposed upon the State]”).
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Menaker & Greenwald, supra note 81, at 78 (quoting Rompetrol Group N.V. v Romania).
Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 26.
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c) ‘Preponderance of the evidence’ – akin to the balance of probabilities and
featured in Section 3(G)(a) of the Uniform Tennis Anti-Corruption
Program. 100

Given the civil law nature of many cases and the discretion afforded to
panels to apply a particular standard of proof, the default standard of proof in
most disputes in international arbitration is currently the balance of
probabilities. 101
However, international sports law has generally differed from international
arbitration law in the sense that it is more willing to deviate from the balance of
probabilities standard because “the comfortable satisfaction standard of proof
works very well for sport, particularly as it is clearly defined and then applied in a
consistent manner.” 102 Practically speaking, a comfortable satisfaction standard
requires the bearer of the burden of proof to present a stronger case than it would
have had to if the standard was the balance of probabilities. 103 In fact, CAS has
broken from international legal tradition by often requiring one standard of proof
for the sporting organization, and a lower one for the athlete. 104
This international sports law norm has developed perhaps as a response to
the overarching norm of requiring a heightened standard of proof under qualifying
circumstances. “[F]or matters that have serious implications for a tribunal’s
jurisdiction[] or are quasi-criminal in nature (e.g., allegations of fraud, corruption
etc.) or if the arbitration rules specif[y] a heightened standard, tribunals have
applied a heightened standard of proof.” 105 In particular, CAS panels have adopted
the comfortable satisfaction standard, which is commonly used in the
international sports arbitration context, 106 when confronted with “cases involving
personal reputation and professional misconduct.” 107 For instance, in N., J., Y.,
W. v. FINA, 108 the second case in which a standard of comfortable satisfaction
was applied, the panel noted that “a lower standard of proof than is required in a
100
101
102
103
104
105

106

Id.
Duggal, supra note 68, at 42–43.
Davies, supra note 42, at 22.
See Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 26.
See id. at 15–16.
Duggal, supra note 68, at 42. See also Davies, supra note 42, at 4 (highlighting the Briginshaw test,
which established that “that the more serious the allegation and its consequences, the higher the
level of proof required for a matter to be substantiated. The standard is not beyond reasonable
doubt, but the more serious the allegation, the more persuasive the proof must be.”).
Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 27.

107

Peter Charlish, The Biological Passport: Closing the Net on Doping, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 61, 66
(2011).

108

Award, CAS Case No. 1998/A/208 22 December 1998, in DIGEST OF CAS AWARDS II 1998-2000,
234 (Matthieu Reeb ed., 2002).
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criminal case is appropriate in doping cases . . . because disciplinary cases are not
of a criminal nature. Rather, according to the panel, disciplinary cases are of a
private law of association nature.” 109
Again, athlete challenges to doping sanctions provide a robust example. In
addition to allocating the burden of proof to the anti-doping agency, Article 3.1
of the WADC states that “[t]he standard of proof shall be whether the AntiDoping Organization has established an anti-doping rule violation to the comfortable
satisfaction of the hearing body, bearing mind the seriousness of the allegation which is made.” 110
The subsequent adoption of the WADC by international sports federations such
as the IAAF has normalized this heightened standard of proof in doping cases. 111
The application of the comfortable satisfaction standard has grown such that a
2014 CAS media release noted that the standard of comfortable satisfaction was
a constant across decisions for over thirty athletes in anti-doping cases. 112 One
justification for this widespread use of a heightened standard of proof in doping
challenges is due to “the gravity of the allegations . . . [in which] [t]he only thing
that can be said for certain is that a higher standard of proof will be required in
these cases.” 113 Interestingly, the international sporting community accepts this
heightened standard of proof in cases where the challenged sanction is a two-yearlong ineligibility, leading one to believe that CAS would have no problem applying
the comfortable satisfaction standard where the ineligibility period is much longer,
as in Semenya’s case. 114
Doping challenges are not the only cases in which CAS has applied the
standard of comfortable satisfaction. For example, “[w]ith respect to FIFA
disciplinary proceedings, CAS has also found the standard of comfortable
satisfaction to be applicable on the basis of the wording in Article 97 of the FIFA
Disciplinary Code (FIFA DC),” 115 particularly in quasi-criminal contexts. In the
alleged bribery case of Bin Hammam v. FIFA, 116 the CAS panel applied a standard
of comfortable satisfaction when considering Mr. Bin Hammam’s appeal of his

109

Michael Straubel, Enhancing the Performance of the Doping Court: How the Court of Arbitration for Sport Can
Do its Job Better, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1203, 1268 (2005).

110

World Anti-Doping Code, art. 3.1 (2015) (emphasis added).
Id.

111
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CAS, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Delivers Two Reasoned Awards in the Matter of 39 Russian
Athletes VS/ The IOC, CAS MEDIA RELEASE (Apr. 23, 2018), http://perma.cc/XFM9-DHHP.
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McLaren, supra note 94, at 212.
See id.

114
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Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 29.
CAS 2011/A/2625 (July 19, 2012).
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“lifetime ban from the [FIFA] for allegedly offering bribes to buy votes in a FIFA
election” for FIFA President. 117 The CAS panel in this case
overturned FIFA’s lifetime ban, even though it found ‘it to be more likely
than not that Mr[.] Bin Hammam was the source of the money,’ [because of
its conclusion that the evidence] does not permit the majority of the Panel to
reach the standard of comfortable satisfaction in relation to the matters on
which [Mr. Bin Hammam] was charged. 118

The Bin Hammam case thus provides another example of when CAS has
chosen to apply a heightened standard of proof: the standard of comfortable
satisfaction was required because this was a case in which the sporting
organization abridged an individual’s right to participate in a sporting activity.

D. International Arbitration Norms on the Evaluation of
Evidence
Just as codified international law on arbitration proceedings does not supply
much guidance on applications of the burden and standard of proof, it also fails
to shed much light on the admissibility and evaluation of evidence before a
tribunal, 119 especially for the type of scientific evidence relevant to cases like
Semenya’s. First, with respect to admissibility of evidence, “both Article 184(1)
PILA and 9(1) of the IBA Rules support the ability of the arbitrators to decide
whether or not a given piece of evidence is admissible, with Article 9(1) specifically
providing that the ‘Arbitral Tribunal shall determine the admissibility . . . of
evidence.’” 120 Even with an entire article devoted to the “Admissibility and
Assessment of Evidence,” the IBA Rules on Evidence primarily focus on
production issues, such as protecting privileged and confidential documents, but
not necessarily the evaluation of evidence. 121 Rather, Article 9(1) reflects the
general tone of allowing the arbitral tribunal determine the evidentiary rules
according to the panel’s best judgment in keeping with “considerations of
procedural economy, proportionality, fairness or equality of the Parties.” 122
Further, in international sports, “[t]here is no rule in CAS Code to define what
may, or may not, be admitted in terms of evidence.” 123
117

Menaker & Greenwald, supra note 81, at 86.

118

Id.
Isabelle Van Damme, The Assessment of Expert Evidence on International Arbitration, 9 J. OF INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 401, 401 (2018).
Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 39 (quoting IBA, IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International
Arbitration, art. 9.1 (May 29, 2010)).
See ASHFORD, supra note 69, at 143.

119
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Id. at 141.
Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 39.
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International law outside of the sporting arbitration context likewise
provides little guidance on the evaluation of evidence. Whereas the IBA Rules on
Evidence at least dictate overarching principles arbitrators should adhere to when
admitting evidence and hearing expert testimony, the Rules are largely silent on
how an arbitral panel should evaluate that evidence. 124 Similarly, the WTO
Appellate Body provides only cursory guiding principles, mandating that panels
“must ‘verify that the scientific basis comes from a respected and qualified
source,’” and that “‘the views must be considered to be legitimate science
according to the standards of the relevant scientific community,’” 125 but does not
detail specifics on how panels should weigh and consider such evidence. In fact,
the dearth of guidance on evaluating evidence has led commentators to conclude
that “[t]here is no steadfast rule determining what kind of evidence must be
considered of higher or of better quality per se.” 126
Since arbitrators rely on their discretion to determine the rules in their
proceedings, some commentators have argued that arbitrators should explain:
the type of proof they are looking for and whether proof rendered by the
parties is sufficient or not;
their level of satisfaction from the proof provided by the parties and whether
they will draw an adverse inference, if one party does not submit a certain
type of proof, requested by the arbitrators;
the methodology by which they will evaluate evidence. 127

The above framework is particularly informative for CAS, for “each CAS
panel has the freedom to decide the evidentiary weight of any evidence on the
record unless such freedom is limited in the relevant regulations.” 128 Because
“[t]he CAS Panel also has the freedom to choose between contradictory elements
of evidence in the decision-making process,” 129 it is important for the arbitrators
to fully detail their evidentiary procedures in fairness to the parties. Thus, the fact
that international arbitrators are accorded high discretion and deference in
determining the rules of evidence in their respective proceedings need not be a
detriment to fairness to the parties; rather, it can be an avenue for furthering
justice by providing maximal flexibility for each panel to adapt to the needs of its
current case.

124
125

126
127
128
129

See generally ASHFORD, supra note 69; ZUBERBÜHLER ET AL., supra note 72.
Appellate Body Reports, U.S. – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones
Dispute/Canada – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute, ¶ 591,
WTO Doc. WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R (adopted Nov. 12, 2008).
O’MALLEY, supra note 64, at 197.
Bhushan, supra note 63, at 610.
Rigozzi & Quinn, supra note 43, at 52.
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The 2015 Chand case put the need for greater guidance on the admissibility
and evaluation of evidence on stark display. In Chand, the CAS panel confronted
what can only be described as a confusing array of scientific opinions. For
instance, Professor Richard Holt, an expert testifying for Chand, explained that in
his opinion,
the Hyperandrogenism Regulations [were] ‘scientifically unsound.’ Professor
Holt identified two scientific flaws in the assumption that elevated
endogenous testosterone in female athletes confers a competitive advantage.
First, endogenous testosterone does not explain the difference between male
and female athletic performance. Second, there is no convincing evidence that
endogenous testosterone enhances athletic performance in female athletes,
including those with hyperandrogenism. 130

Another expert for Chand, Dr. Sari van Anders, stated that “the existing
scientific research does not establish that endogenous testosterone is the basis for
successful athletic performance.” 131 During the hearing, even the IAAF’s experts
“agreed that, ‘we don’t have much evidence’ and there was no ‘definitive proof’
of the link [between testosterone levels and elevated athletic performance in
women],” but opined that the “available science suggests that testosterone is ‘the
most important factor’ that could explain the difference.” 132 Further, the Chand
panel had to grapple with direct versus indirect evidence, as another of the experts,
Dr. Stéphane Bermon, “accepted that the evidence was indirect and said that it
was not possible to obtain direct evidence” 133 on the effect of elevated
testosterone levels on athletic performance. The barrage of conflicting scientific
evidence caused the panel to ultimately defer on a final decision, asking the IAAF
to present more concrete evidence on the necessity of the Hyperandrogenism
Regulations. Without a clearer standard for admitting and evaluating scientific
evidence, however, subsequent CAS panels hearing similar issues may confront
the same problems as the Chand panel.

IV. CAS P ROCEEDINGS T HEN AND N OW : A N A RGUMENT FOR
C HANGES TO THE E VIDENTIARY R ULES
Having discussed the contours of international law governing international
arbitral tribunals in general, this Comment now turns to Semenya’s challenge of
the new IAAF regulation barring women with testosterone levels above 5 nmol/L
from certain international competition track and field events. 134 While the
130

Chand, supra note 3, at ¶ 136.
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Id. at ¶ 163.
Id. at ¶ 198 (citations omitted).

132
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Id. at ¶ 214.
See Roe, supra note 14.
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arguments against the new regulation range from gender discrimination (there is
no comparable ban for male athletes with atypical testosterone levels) to potential
racial discrimination (many women with elevated levels of testosterone come
“from developing nations who do not conform to Western standards of
femininity” 135), this Comment focuses on the fairness of the CAS proceeding
itself. As the sections below demonstrate, the CAS panel in the Chand case, which
was the last panel to have considered a challenge to a similar ban, did not establish
evidentiary rules that reflected the parties’ relative access to the requisite evidence.
Further, based on the limited information in CAS’s media release on the outcome
of Semenya’s case, the most recent official publication on the decision as this
Comment goes to press, the proceedings in Semenya’s case did not substantially
differ from those in Chand. 136 Because the media release did not expound further
on the procedural aspects of the case, 137 this Comment assumes that the panel did
not deviate from the proceedings laid out in Chand. In light of this reality, this
Comment argues that the Semenya panel should have: (1) shifted the burden of
proof onto the regulating body; (2) applied a heightened standard of proof of
comfortable satisfaction, rather than balance of probabilities, due to the highstakes nature of such cases; and (3) adopted a Daubert-like standard for evaluating
scientific evidence, particularly scientific studies. 138

A. CAS Should Have Shifted the Burden of Proof to Regulating
Bodies
As mentioned in Section III, the lack of binding authority on most
international arbitral tribunals has led to the development of a number of norms
governing the allocation of the burden of proof. Perhaps the most notable of these
norms is that tribunals elect to shift the burden of proof to the party that asserts
a fact under certain circumstances. Such a nonbinding legal framework affords
international tribunals great latitude in adjusting to the circumstances of each case.
For many cases in international arbitration, the claimant and the respondent
appear to have high parity in resources and access to information (as in arbitration
between sovereign nations, for example). 139 However, this parity of power is
unlikely to exist in many cases before CAS, because CAS serves as the tribunal for
135
136
137
138

139

See Longman, supra note 22.
2019 CAS Media Release, supra note 10.
Id.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See Section IV.C below for
a more detailed analysis.
See, for example, Waguih Elie George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. the Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/15 (2009); Alan T. Blackwell, Acid Rain: Corrosive Problem in Canadian-American
Relations, 47 SASK. L. REV. 1, 35 (1982).
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managing disputes between athletes and the international federations governing
sports. Therefore, in order to adhere to the overarching principles of fairness to
the parties as well as procedural economy, CAS should exercise its discretion in
employing a particular burden of proof allocation for cases that involve limitations
on individuals’ right to participate in international sporting events.
First, CAS should consider procedural fairness when assigning the burden
of proof between parties. The IBA Rules on Evidence repeatedly reaffirm the idea
that the taking of evidence should be conducted with “an efficient, economical
and fair process” 140 in mind. While this wording can be construed to speak
primarily to the time and money spent on the arbitrations, it also reminds arbitral
tribunals that, fundamentally, all parties deserve a fair hearing, for “[i]t is axiomatic
that a party who is not afforded a fair opportunity to present its evidence will not
have been afforded due process.” 141 Further, it has been noted that, “[t]o provide
procedural fairness and substantive justice, a private legal system for resolving
Olympic and international sports disputes must have, at a minimum . . . a full and
fair opportunity for all parties to be heard.” 142
Given this norm of procedural fairness to the parties, Semenya should have
submitted, and the panel should have considered and accepted, an argument that
the IAAF bears the burden of definitively demonstrating that women with
testosterone levels above 5 nmol/L have an unacceptable advantage over other
women in athletic competition because the IAAF is the party moving to infringe
on Semenya’s human right to compete. 143 Whether it is proving that women with
such testosterone levels do possess a notable, unacceptable advantage, or that the
regulation as written is reasonable and proportionate, the IAAF should carry the
burden of proof. It would have been unfair for Semenya to bear the onus of
proving the IAAF’s premise false, when in reality the IAAF was the party that had
gone on the offensive and deprived Semenya of her eligibility to compete without
any wrongdoing on her part. 144 One can even favorably compare this to the
principle that in criminal cases, the prosecutor bears the burden of proving the
accused guilty, because the prosecutor is asserting a fact which, if true, would
deprive the defendant of his or her human right to liberty. 145
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IBA, IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, art. 2.1 (May 29, 2010) [hereinafter
IBA Rules].
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O’MALLEY, supra note 64, at 5.
Mitten, supra note 45, at 20.
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Peterson, supra note 27, at 329.
In fact, upon announcing the new regulation, the IAAF itself noted that the regulations were not
“intended as any kind of judgment . . . on any athlete.” See IAAF, supra note 9.
See Menaker & Greenwald, supra note 81, at 85.
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Another argument in favor of shifting the burden of proof to preserve
procedural fairness is related to the clear information asymmetry between
Semenya and the IAAF. When it announced the new DSD Regulations, the IAAF
asserted that its regulation was grounded in “a decade and more of research.” 146
The IAAF’s apparent possession of a wealth of research actually cuts in favor of
shifting the burden of proof, as it proves that the IAAF had the resources to
defend its assertion that allowing women with naturally high testosterone levels to
compete alongside women who have “normal” ranges of testosterone results in
unfair competition. 147 Further, the fact that scientists are often commissioned by
sports regulating bodies increases the risk that the scientific studies conducted will
be skewed in favor of the regulating organizations’ viewpoint. 148 Here, since the
IAAF commissioned the study, those conducting the study likely had a conflict of
interest resulting in a non-neutral study. Add on the fact that the hearing before
CAS had been expedited in this case, effectively preventing Semenya from
commissioning robust studies of her own to refute the IAAF’s presentation of
evidence, even assuming she had the resources to do so, and the inequity between
the parties becomes even more striking. In light of this egregious imbalance in
access to evidence regarding the effect of endogenous testosterone levels on fair
competition, combined with the fact that the IAAF is the party moving to abridge
the rights of a class of individuals, the case for a shifted burden of proof was
urgently compelling.
One challenge to this approach is that CAS has not applied such a shift in
the most relevant, though non-binding, precedent. In its decision in Chand, that
CAS panel noted that Chand initially “suggested that IAAF bore the burden of
establishing the scientific basis of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations to the
comfortable satisfaction of the Panel . . . [but] appeared to resile [sic] from that
position during the hearing by expressly accepting that Athlete bears the burden
of proof on the issue of scientific basis.” 149 While it is unclear why Chand changed
her position, the fact remains that ultimately, despite saying that the burden of
proof shifted “to the IAAF to establish that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations
are necessary, reasonable and proportionate for the purposes of establishing a
level playing field for female athletes,” 150 the panel still implied that Chand needed
146
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to prove that the available science did not support Hyperandrogenism
Regulations. Essentially, the CAS panel held that because the parties presented
competing scientific evidence and the IAAF demonstrated that the
Hyperandrogenism Regulations were based on data available to it, Chand still
needed to show that the IAAF did not have a proper basis for its Regulation. 151
Ultimately, the CAS panel’s ruling did not clearly assign the burden of proving the
necessity of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations to the IAAF. Semenya could have
argued that, by deferring implementation of the 2014 Hyperandrogenism
Regulations, the CAS panel acknowledged the IAAF’s evidentiary burden when it
sought to exclude individuals from competition based on a genetically
predetermined condition.
Mitigating the challenge presented by the Chand panel’s equivocation on the
burden of proof, however, is the fact that a shifted burden of proof is not
unprecedented, even in the limited realm of cases before CAS: the challenges to
doping violations serve as a comparison point for Semenya. For just as CAS
sought fit to shift the burden of proof onto the regulating body in doping cases,
so too should it have done the same in Semenya’s case, where the right to
participate in international sporting events is similarly, if not more heavily,
implicated. The argument would have been that the regulating body in this case,
the IAAF, should bear the burden of proof, since it initiated the limitation on
participation in international sports. This is akin to the scenario in which the antidoping organization that is limiting participation in sports through sanctions on
the accused athlete must prove the accuracy of its allegations. 152 In short,
persuasive precedent exists for both positions on allocating the burden of proof
between the two parties. The CAS panel assigned to Semenya’s case should
accordingly have considered the factors of procedural economy and overarching
fairness as described above in deciding the appropriate allocation of the burden
of proof.
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athlete successfully shifted the burden of proof ‘back’ to the antidoping agency . . . The anti-doping
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B. CAS Should Have Applied a Standard of Proof of
Comfortable Satisfaction, Not Balance of Probabilities, to
the Claims Brought by the IAAF
In the context of selecting a standard of proof, international norms also
provide arbitral tribunals with great flexibility. 153 Panels hearing cases on
international sports law often apply either the balance of probabilities or the
comfortable satisfaction standard of proof. 154 Regardless of the final allocation of
the burden of proof, the standard of proof required in cases that implicate an
athlete’s right to participate in sports or that otherwise involve high stakes
consequences in the sporting world should be higher than merely “more likely
than not[.]” In the present case, the CAS panel should only have accepted the
IAAF’s claim that allowing women with endogenously high testosterone to
compete would interfere with fair and meaningful competition if it was
comfortably satisfied that the evidence supported this proposition.
The argument for adopting such a standard of proof once again relies on the
fact that this case involves important substantive rights for an entire class of
athletes. According to the Olympic Charter, National Olympic Committees must
work to “ensure that no athlete ‘has been excluded for racial, religious or political
reasons or by reason of other forms of discrimination.’” 155 This directive reflects
the universal value that “[t]he practice of sport is a human right,” 156 and there is
no intelligible reason why other international sporting organizations should not
be similarly enjoined from discriminatorily excluding an athlete. Recognizing that
“the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard must be applied with respect to both the
seriousness of the offence and the type of the offence,” 157 CAS panels have
discretionarily applied this standard in numerous cases. Specifically, the
comfortable satisfaction standard
is most commonly applied in disciplinary proceedings, due to the often
serious repercussions of being found guilty of a relevant offence [because t]he
use of this standard offers somewhat of a safeguard to the accused, requiring
the satisfaction of the offence to a higher standard than that typically used in
civil proceedings. 158
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Id. at 27.

242

Vol. 20 No. 1

Problems of Proof

Lin

Once again, challenges to doping violations sanctions prove instructive.
“The comfortable satisfaction standard is well-established in doping cases, and
features in various articles in the WADC.” 159 For instance, the CAS panels in
Oliveira v. USADA 160 and Querimaj v. IWF, 161 cases in which the accused athletes
had ingested forbidden substances thought to enhance athletic performance,
applied the standard of comfortable satisfaction and held that the athlete needed
only prove that “ingestion of [the specified substance] was not intended to
enhance” athletic performance. 162 Likewise, the CAS panel in Veerpalu v.
International Ski Federation 163 “applied the standard of comfortable satisfaction to
invalidate a regulation for a human growth hormone testing procedure for doping
cases.” 164 Although not every doping challenge before CAS warrants an
application of the comfortable satisfaction standard, 165 such a standard is
commonly accepted in doping violations challenges because the stakes are high
for the challenging athlete. Semenya’s case exemplified the scenarios in which a
comfortable satisfaction standard should apply: were the new DSD Regulations
to take effect, they would deprive an entire class of athletes from certain
international sporting events indefinitely, which constitutes a deprivation of an
individual’s right to participate in sports. 166
The most formidable challenge to raising this argument in Semenya’s case
was the fact that the closest precedent, Chand, did not apply the standard of
comfortable satisfaction. In fact, the panel in Chand explicitly considered the
comfortable satisfaction standard and yet adopted the balance of probabilities
standard, referencing the Pistorius v. IAAF 167 panel. The Pistorius panel “noted that
the standard of proof is clearly not the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard
applicable in criminal cases in most jurisdictions.” 168 The Chand panel went on to
reject the comfortable satisfaction standard, although it did mitigate its statements
by conceding “that the requisite standard to justify discrimination of a
fundamental right, including the right to compete that is recognised in the
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Hyperandrogenism Regulations themselves, requires the IAAF to overcome
positively the onus to establish that justification.” 169
In response to this unfavorable precedent, Semenya should have relied on
another accepted norm, that “CAS panels are not bound by findings of other
arbitrators in earlier cases,” 170 particularly when a unique set of facts counsels
against being bound by inapplicable rulings in previous cases. Indeed, one major
difference between this most recent case and Chand is the fact that this time, the
new DSD Regulations seem to be targeted, and thus more egregiously
discriminatory, than the ones at issue in Chand. Specifically, the DSD Regulations
appear to be directed at Semenya because the restricted events named in the
regulations range include “400m, hurdles races, 800m, 1500m, one mile races and
combined events over the same distances,” 171 yet the studies purported to justify
the regulations suggest “that female athletes with higher levels of testosterone had
an advantage in five events[:] the 400m, 400m hurdles, 800m, hammer throw, and
pole vault.” 172 The discrepancy between the events listed in the study as being
most susceptible to unfair competition and the events actually restricted by the
DSD Regulations thus seems “like a very arbitrary and selective way in which to
apply regulations, and [seems] targeted [toward] Semenya.” 173 Indeed, CAS’s
executive summary of Semenya’s case noted “the paucity of evidence to justify the
inclusion of” the 1500m and one mile events in the DSD Regulations
restrictions, 174 bolstering the claim that the regulations were not grounded in
scientifically proven outcomes, but rather were a direct response to Semenya’s
personal successes. In light of this selective application of the ban, the panel
should have weighed the higher risk of targeted discrimination in this case in favor
of applying the higher standard of proof of comfortable satisfaction, especially
since allegations of discriminatory intent generally warrant greater scrutiny. 175
Finally, in addition to the importance of the rights at stake for athletes who
wish to compete internationally, the fact that the comfortable satisfaction standard
has strong persuasive precedent in other cases before CAS, which the Chand panel
169
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itself acknowledged, weighed in favor of adopting the comfortable satisfaction
standard over the balance of probabilities standard. First, the fact that such a
standard is common in international sports arbitration signifies that CAS
arbitrators are familiar with applying such a standard and would be able to do so
effectively. Any argument that requiring a balance of probabilities standard of
proof would lead to greater procedural economy would therefore not be
persuasive. More importantly, adopting the comfortable satisfaction standard of
proof in Semenya’s challenge would have sent a strong message to the
international sporting community that encroachments on athletes’ rights to
compete will be scrutinized carefully. By adopting this commonly accepted
standard, the CAS panel in Semenya’s case would have reaped the benefit of
institutional knowledge by adhering to both persuasive, if non-binding, CAS
precedent while also protecting the individual right to compete in athletics by
attributing due weight to the claims against the ban.

C. CAS Should Have Adopted the Daubert Standard for
Considering Scientific Evidence
Another evidentiary issue CAS panels must consider is what evidence to
admit and how to evaluate the admitted evidence. In this context, again, the lack
of international guidance allows a panel to decide the most appropriate standards
on a case-by-case basis. 176 The nature of the evidence expected to be presented
before the panel therefore becomes highly relevant. 177 And in Semenya’s case, the
controversy surrounding the IAAF’s evidence in support of its DSD Regulations
suggests that evidence was as contradictory evidence as in Chand, which resulted
in a deferred implementation of the old Hyperandrogenism Regulations until
more conclusive evidence came to light. The lack of guidance for both current
and subsequent panels hearing such contradictory evidence rendered the issue ripe
in Semenya’s case. This Comment suggests the Daubert framework of policing and
evaluating scientific evidence as a desirable standard for CAS arbitrations.

1. The Chand decision did not resolve how CAS panels should evaluate
evidence.
The Chand panel left many questions unanswered, perhaps the most pressing
of which was the quality of proof required to justify a ban as necessary, reasonable,
and proportionate. 178 In that case, the panel heard undisputed evidence that there
176
177
178

See Davies, supra note 42, at 23 (“CAS has stated that it is not bound by the rules of evidence.”).
See Van Damme, supra note 119, at 402.
Boyd, supra note 5, at 22–23 (“The Panel remained silent on what competitive advantage would
make the Regulation valid, but the Panel reiterated that it required substantial difference.”).
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is a “[10–12 percent] difference between elite male and elite female athletic
performance.” 179 The panel held that the IAAF did not meet its burden of
justifying the then-contemporary ban on women with over 10 nmol/L of
testosterone from international athletic competition in part because the IAAF did
not demonstrate a similar differential in athletic performance between women
with testosterone levels above that cutoff as opposed to below the cutoff, or
within the “normal” range for women. 180 However, the CAS panel did not provide
more specific guidance on what would qualify as sufficient evidence to justify the
IAAF’s Hyperandrogenism Regulations, for the CAS panel only suggested “that a
slight advantage such as [one percent] ‘may not justify a separation of athletes
within the female category, given other relevant variables that legitimately affect
athletic performance.’” 181
This lack of formal and precedential guidance only punted the problem
down the road in future cases. In Semenya’s challenge, the inability to define the
quality of evidence necessary to justify the Regulations created a high level of
uncertainty for both Semenya and the IAAF, particularly since the scientific
studies presented by the IAAF were already being challenged in the scientific
community before the CAS proceedings began. For instance,
[c]ritics [of the new DSD Regulations] say IAAF researchers Stéphane
Bermon and Pierre-Yves Garnier (who was sanctioned for interfering with an
IAAF ethics investigation last year) essentially re-ran the statistical analyses
on the same data [from Chand] until they produced a different conclusion.
But three independent researchers—Roger Pielke of the University of
Colorado-Boulder, Ross Tucker of the University of Cape Town, and Erik
Boye of Oslo University Hospital—couldn’t reproduce Bermon’s and
Garnier’s analyses with publicly available data. 182

If the IAAF merely presented a re-run of the studies used to justify the
Hyperandrogenism Regulations at issue in Chand’s case, and those studies were
clearly insufficient to justify that ban, 183 then the case for adopting a clear
framework for evaluating the disputed evidence in future cases is even stronger.

2. The Semenya panel should have considered adopting the Daubert
standard for evaluating scientific evidence.
In the absence of such guidance from international arbitration law, other
frameworks could have informed the CAS panel’s decision on how to evaluate
scientific evidence. One such framework was the Daubert standard from U.S. law,
179
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which replaced the relevance and general acceptance standards previously used in
American courts to evaluate evidence. 184 The modern Daubert framework arose
out of three cases that “clarified and expanded the scope of the [American]
Federal Rules of Evidence as they apply to expert witnesses.” 185 These three cases,
often known as the Daubert trilogy, stand for the proposition that scientific
evidence and expert testimony should be scrutinized for both the general
methodology applied in the study as well as the soundness of the expert’s
conclusions. 186
First, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 187 the U.S. Supreme Court
overruled a precedential holding that made general acceptance the test for
admitting scientific evidence. 188 Instead, the Court held that trial judges were to
be gatekeepers of evidence and were “responsible for ensuring that an expert’s
testimony was based on a reliable foundation and relevant.” 189 In addition to
overturning the previous standard articulated in Frye v. U.S., 190 “the Court [in
Daubert] adopted a new framework for evaluating the reliability of scientific
evidence based on four considerations: falsifiability, peer review, error rates, and
‘acceptability’ in the relevant scientific community.” 191 In essence, the court
endorsed a multi-factor standard emphasizing “the principles and methodology
of the scientific proposition and not [ ] the proffered conclusions.” 192
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The second case of the trilogy, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 193 expanded the
trial judge’s role as the gatekeeper of admissible scientific evidence by applying the
Daubert factors to a scientific expert’s conclusions as well as methodology. Joiner
indicated that the trial judge “has the discretion to totally reject and disallow an
expert’s opinion, even if based on an accepted methodology, if the judge finds
that the expert’s conclusion is not reliably based on that methodology.” 194 And
finally, the third case in the Daubert trilogy, Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 195
“extended the standards of Daubert to include not only expert testimony about
matters that are scientific but also expert testimony based on technical and other
specialized knowledge.” 196
While at first glance the Daubert framework appears to be geared toward the
American legal system, it can still prove instructive in international arbitration. In
CAS arbitrations, the panel must act like the American trial judge in that the panel
must decide what evidence to admit. 197 However, the two systems differ in that
the decision-maker in the American legal system is often a panel of non-expert
jurors, not the trial judge, whereas in CAS arbitrations, the arbitral tribunal
evaluates the evidence it admitted. 198 The unification of the acts of determining
admissibility and considering evidence on the merits into one entity in
international arbitrations renders the Daubert framework unsuitable for structuring
rules of admissibility in the arbitral hearing, in part because “[n]owhere in
international arbitration . . . is there a system like that which exists in U.S.
domestic courts to challenge the admissibility of evidence presented by an
expert.” 199 However, because the Daubert framework was intended to only allow
reliable, quality evidence to be heard, it still provides ample guidance for
international arbitrators in the consideration and evaluation of evidence.
In Semenya’s case, for instance, the IAAF should have been required to
prove its assertion that endogenously elevated testosterone in females produces
an unfair athletic advantage. 200 To do this, the IAAF should have produced studies
that isolate endogenous testosterone (as opposed to exogenous testosterone or
193
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other factors) as the sole driver of the difference in athletic performance in
hyperandrogenic women. But because there are so many inputs that result in
particular levels of athletic performance, 201 and attempting to isolate testosterone
as the driver of such performance “glosses over the fact that innumerable other
natural and environmental factors contribute to each athlete’s relative advantages
and disadvantages—from height and lung capacity to coaching and training
facilities,” 202—any study that purports to identify endogenous testosterone as the
sole cause of such performance levels must be highly scrutinized. To evaluate a
study claiming to isolate testosterone, the CAS panel could have applied some of
the Daubert factors by asking whether the study’s conclusion had been tested,
subjected to peer review, established with an acceptably low error rate, and
accepted by the scientific community. 203 Similarly, the CAS panel could have used
these factors to test whether other scientific conclusions presented in Semenya’s
case were sufficiently well-established and reliable to justify upholding the highstakes DSD Regulations.
As with the arguments for a shift in the burden of proof and adoption of a
comfortable satisfaction standard of proof proposed above, the argument for
implementing the Daubert framework in CAS proceedings is not without its
challenges. In addition to the aforementioned limitation that “arbitral proceedings
[are] more akin to a bench trial than a jury trial,” 204 the fact remains that other
international arbitral tribunals have not appeared to adopt a similar framework for
admitting and evaluating evidence. However, since “the discretionary power of
the arbitrator [to appraise evidence] is not open to question,” 205 and “the tribunal
is able to accord its own weight to any evidence presented,” 206 a CAS panel
adopting a clear test for evaluating evidence that it has the discretion to consider
is hardly objectionable. 207 The fact that no comparable framework is currently
used in international law is not an argument against applying and clarifying such a
standard now, but rather an argument for doing so.
It must also be noted that even if the CAS panel failed to adopt a Daubertlike approach to evaluating evidence, the scientific studies put forth by the IAAF
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did not even meet the lower general acceptance standard the Daubert trilogy
replaced, nor the standards from other international dispute resolution fora. 208
The overturned Frye standard simply held that “the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” 209 Meanwhile, the WTO
Appellate Body, for example, requires scientific evidence to “have the necessary
scientific and methodological rigour to be considered reputable science.” 210 The
evidence put forth by the IAAF met neither of these standards, for the high level
of controversy surrounding the scientific evidence and expert testimonies first in
Chand, and then in Semenya’s case, clearly prevented those “scientific findings
[from being] ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which [they] belong[].’” 211 At a minimum, then, the CAS panel
in Semenya’s case should have rectified the laxity of the panel in Chand by at least
vetting the scientific evidence presented against a standard of generally accepted
methodology. Indeed, the IAAF studies’ failure to meet the lower bar supplied by
Frye and the WTO Appellate Body rules exemplified the need to implement a
clarified approach that allows arbitral tribunals to scrutinize evidence carefully,
especially when important substantive rights are involved. Whether by crafting
clear standards for evaluating scientific evidence akin to the Daubert standard or
taking on the more active role of appointing a neutral expert, 212 the CAS panel
should have leveraged its procedural flexibility to ensure that the evidence used to
substantiate either party’s claims did so reliably. 213

V. C ONCLUSION
For over 50 years, the international sporting community has struggled with
notions of fairness when it comes to classifying athletic events on a male-female
binary. Today, the question remains as unsettled as the first day on which sextesting was introduced. In announcing its most recent DSD Regulations, the
IAAF renewed the controversy over the eligibility of intersex individuals to
208
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participate as females in international sporting events, this time with respect to
one particular athlete: Caster Semenya. The new regulations triggered a case that
mirrored the 2015 Chand case, which also challenged the Hyperandrogenism
Regulations then in effect for impermissible discrimination.
While Chand amounted to a temporary victory for hyperandrogenic women
in that it stayed the implementation of the Hyperandrogenism Regulations at the
time, the proceedings left many questions unresolved. Substantively, the Chand
panel did not reach a conclusion as to whether hyperandrogenic individuals truly
receive a significant advantage in athletic performance due to their elevated
testosterone levels. Procedurally, the Chand panel also failed to answer important
evidentiary questions related in international sports arbitration. Although the
Chand panel assigned the burden of proof to the IAAF after Chand made a prima
facie showing that the Hyperandrogenism Regulations were discriminatory, the
CAS panel still seemed to hold Chand responsible for proving the claims in her
case, rather than having the IAAF bear the burden. Additionally, the CAS panel
rejected the comfortable satisfaction standard of proof in favor of the balance of
probabilities standard of proof following nothing more than a cursory
consideration of both standards. And finally, although the panel entreated the
IAAF to bring more evidence demonstrating that endogenously high testosterone
levels result in unfair competition, it did not specify the strength of the evidence
needed to uphold the Hyperandrogenism Regulations.
Given the indeterminacy surrounding the taking of evidence in CAS
arbitrations, in cases in which athletes’ fundamental right to compete are involved,
arbitral panels should: shift the burden of proof onto the party abridging those
rights; employ a standard of proof such that the panel can only accept such an
abridgement if the panel is comfortably satisfied that the abridgement is justified;
and set out a clear framework, based on the Daubert standard in U.S. law, for
evaluating the scientific evidence presented. Although challenges to implementing
each of these evidentiary standards abound, the lack of binding evidentiary rules
and natural flexibility of international arbitration law provide the latitude needed
to adopt the proposed measures. And the interests of the impacted athletes in
their individual right to participate in sporting events demand it.
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